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Recent studies emphasize the occurrence of conflict as a rational economic 
activity as well as production and exchange. Agents are assumed to divide 
their efforts into fighting and productive activities, or as commonly denoted 
in ‘guns’ and ‘butter’. This paper does try to go beyond this ‘manichean’ 
idea, assuming the Boulding’s concept of ‘integrative system’ In particular, 
the paper investigates whether a trade institution  committed to free and fair 
trade could foster ‘peaceful’ benefits for member countries. The analysis, 
produced in a very simplified world, counts as a founding pillar the Contest 
Success Function. The results of the model suggest that in an 
institutionalized scenario agents gain more both in terms of economic utility 
and in terms of peace than in ‘continuing conflict’ and ‘obstructed trade’ 
scenarios. 
 






* Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore di Milano. Earlier versions of 
this paper have been presented at the North America Meeting of 
Peace Science Society (International), November 12-14 2004, 
Houston, and at the European Jan Tinbergen Peace Science 
Conference, June 9-11 2004, Amsterdam, where I benefited from 
illuminating comments. I am deeply indebted to Simona Beretta, 
Walter Isard, Ray Dacey, Jack Hirshleifer, Carlo Beretta, Guido 
Merzoni for helpful comments. I also warmly thank Alessia Casetta, 
Andrea Locatelli, Lou Zarro, the GMO and, last but not least, 
Damiano Palano and Stefano Procacci for continuous opinion-
sharing. 
 
  1 
MANICHEAN ECONOMICS? 
In recent years a large literature on the economics of conflict has been 
produced. Many scholars agree on the idea to go far beyond the 
traditional domain of economics, namely ‘exchange’ The argument is 
straightforward. You can buy something, but you can also steal it. 
You can appropriate, confiscate, grab, plunder instead of producing, 
contracting or exchanging. Conflict, as a rational activity, plays a role 
as well as exchange. The acknowledged reference among economists 
is the work by Jack Hirshleifer, who labelled conflict as ‘The Dark 
side of the Force”, making an effective analogy with the Star Wars 
saga. According to this illuminating comparison, you cannot tell the 
story of Luke Skywalker and Obe Wan Ben Kenobe forgetting to 
mention Darth Vader1
Central to the argument is the conflict as a permanent feature 
of human interactions. Conflictual and exchange interactions co-exist 
and interact. Indeed, the extreme cases of conflict and harmony, 
namely total peace or total war, do not occur. This idea is consistent 
with one of the basic concepts expounded by Schelling (1960): “In 
fact, the richness of the subject arises from the fact that in international 
affairs there is mutual dependence as well as opposition. Pure conflict, in 
which the interests of two antagonists are completely opposed is a special 
case; it would arise in a war of complete extermination, otherwise not even 
in war”2. And it is also enriched by Hirshleifer  (1991/2001): “War and 
Peace, or more generally conflict and settlement, are usually regarded as 
mutually exclusive.[…]But it will be convenient here to employ a paradigm 
in which the choice is not between ‘going to war’ and ‘making peace’. 
Instead, the parties choose a steady state strategy along a continuum 
ranging between the extremes of struggle and accommodation”3
This argument, however, shows a ‘manichean bias’. In fact, the 
dichotomy ‘exchange vs. conflict’, that I define manichean, also does 
not seem to exhaust the complex range of human economic activities. 
Then, I also consider the vigorous argument of ‘integrative 
relationship’ presented by Boulding (1962). According to his view, 
social systems can be analysed along the lines of three large, 
overlapping and interacting sub-systems: ‘exchange’, ‘threat’ and 
‘integrative’ activities. The integrative system, in particular, 
constitutes the most effective response to threat. In other words, an 
integrative relationship paves the way for conflict management and 
                                                 
1 See Hirshleifer (1994). 
2 Schelling (1960), p.4 
3 Hirshleifer (1991/2001), p. 45 in re-printed edition (2001). 
  2resolution. All human institutions and relationships involve different 
combinations of all three. These three systems governing human 
affairs, practically never occur in pure form. Different ‘states of the 
world’ show different combinations and interactions of the three 
systems.  
Deepening the core argument of this work, I shall assume the 
existence of a world made of two competing countries only. They can 
allocate their own resources between productive and unproductive, 
or as commonly denoted between ‘butter’ and ‘guns’. They also 
consider a joint-production, say the ‘pie’, as a contestable output to 
be split. These countries are assumed to behave like rational risk-
neutral agents. They are utility maximizers, and moreover neither 
benevolent or malevolent. Agents are also assumed to be unitary 
actors. That is, considering the case of nations-states, they are not 
subject to pressure from a variety of internal interest groups. In this 
two-countries world the technology is neutral, that is, both countries 
retain the same level of technology. In addition, geography does not 
matter. 
In such a world different scenarios can emerge depending on 
which system among threat, exchange and integration has the 
dominance on the others: 1) a ‘continuing conflict’ scenario4, where 
conflict is the first option of agents. 2) the ‘obstructed trade’ scenario. 
In this scenario, agents face a trade-off between conflict and 
settlement. Exchange activities between agents are obstructed 
through a complex range of impediments; 3) in the ‘institutional 
scenario’, agents give up a certain amount of resources in order to 
bind themselves into an institution committed to free and fair trade. 
In all scenarios, the threat relationship, namely the exploitation of 
potential force, is captured through the investments in unproductive 
resources. Hence, I will define a scenario more or less ‘peaceful’ 
looking at the level of unproductive ‘guns’ both parties choose. The 
greater is the level of ‘guns’, the less peaceful can be considered that 
scenario. The same parties have an optimising behaviour, that is they 
will prefer the scenario where they are able to get a higher payoff. 
The paper proceeds as follows: the next section presents the 
basic model of the economic theory of conflict and an extension. The 
third section looks at the role that trade policies could play in 
determining the optimal choice between conflict and settlement. The 
fourth section introduces briefly the discussion about the peaceful 
                                                 
4 This definition is borrowed from Hirshleifer (1988). 
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impact of a trade institution and the following section presents the 
‘core’ model of this work, which is intended to capture the 
emergence and the role of institutions in preventing conflict between 
armed parties competing over a contestable output Such model is 
extended in order to take into account the impact of asymmetric 
settlements under the umbrella of trade institution. A final section 
gives a summary and conclusions.   
 
 
I. A FORMAL MODELLING OF CONFLICT AND SETTLEMENT 
As noted above, the pioneering work on modelling conflict in recent 
economic literature is by Jack Hirshleifer, whose foundations are in 
Hirshleifer (1987, 1988, 1989) Specifically, he introduces the study of 
conflict by using four equations. (a) a Resources Partition Equation; (b) 
an  Aggregate Production Equation that is characterized by constant 
returns to scale and constant elasticity of substitution (CES); (c) the 
Contest Success Function (hereafter CSF for brevity) determining the 
outcome of conflict; (d) an income distribution equation5.  
Within Hirshleifer’s basic framework, two risk-neutral parties 
indexed by  2 , 1 = i , make simultaneous once-and-for-all choices about 
their own allocation of resources between ‘butter’ and ‘guns’. Each 
one is endowed with an initial positive endowment of resources, 
2 1 0 , ), , ( = ∞ ∈ i ni , which can be converted into ‘guns’, or ‘butter’ 
according to a Resources Partition Equation defined by: 
 
i z x n i i i ∀ + = ,        ( 1 )  
 
where  [ )( ∞ ∈ ∞ ∈ , , , 0 0 i i z x )
                                                
 respectively denote ‘butter’ and ‘guns’ 
The CES function denoting the contestable output, that is the 
aggregate production function, denoted by Y , becomes a simple 
linear additive function: 
 
2 1 2 1 x x x x Y Y + = = ) , (       ( 2 )  
 
5 The Contest Success Function is a mathematical relation that links the outcome of 
a contest and the efforts of the players. It is actually a founding pillar of many 
models. Selective seminal contributions are by Tullock (1980), O’Keeffe et al. (1984) 
and Rosen (1986). Dixit (1987) develops a general framework for contests using the 
general properties of logit functions. Hirshleifer (1989) focuses on a different form 
for the CSF: the ratio form and logit form. See also Skaperdas (1996) and Clark and 
Riis (1998) for a basic axiomatization. 
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Then, the resources allocated to productive activities determine a 
total contestable output, say the ‘pie’, that is to be distributed 
according to the resources allocated to ‘guns’. The outcome of the 
conflict is determined through a  CSF. It summarizes the relevant 
aspects of what Hirshleifer defines the technology of conflict. In 
particular, even if the CSF can take different forms, I apply the ratio 
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Eventually, each agent’s payoff function is given by: 
 










= =    for  2 , 1 = i     (4) 
 
where the superscripts ‘cc’ denote ‘continuing conflict’. Hence, 
assuming a Nash-Cournot behaviour, each opponent will maximize 
its own payoff expecting that the opponent is choosing the similar 
maximization strategy. Through an ordinary maximization 
technique (under the resources constraint) it is possible to show each 
player’s optimal choice of ‘guns’ given the corresponding choice of 
                                                 
6 Hirshleifer (1989) analyses the different impact of two different function form for 
CSF: the ratio form and the logistic form. In the first case, the contest outcome 
depends upon the ratio of the efforts applied, whilst in the second case it depends 
upon the difference between the resources committed. 
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the contender. The interior Cournot solution in the Hirshleifer’s basic 
model of ‘continuing conflict’ is then given by: 
 
4 2 1 2 1 / ) ( * n n z z z
cc cc cc + = = =       ( 5 )  
 
where the stars subscripted denote the equibrium level throughout 
the paper. Indeed, whatever the amount of resources available for 
each player, the contenders allocate the same absolute value to 
fighting efforts. Therefore the income generated through the 
aggregate production function is equally divided between the two 
contenders. Formally, we have: 
 
) ( * 2 1 2 1 4
1
n n U U U
cc cc cc + = = = ;       ( 6 )  
 
However, in relative terms, the wealthier party devotes fewer 
resources than the poorer side to the contest7.Within the growing 
literature8 applying hirshleifer-style models, Garfinkel and 
Skaperdas (2000) propose an extension in order to discuss a 
settlement condition for two risk-neutral rational opponents. The 
model I present hereafter is in its  one-period version able to 
illustrate the short-run incentives to settle instead to be involved in a 
war9.   
                                                 
7 This is what Hirshleifer (1991) defined The Paradox of Power (POP). In a contest, he 
says, the initially disadvantaged group has an incentive to fight harder. Moreover, 
the less endowed side improves its position compared with the better-endowed 
rival. Hirshleifer, in particular, distinguishes between a strong form and a weak 
form of the POP. The strong form applies when contenders have an initial 
endowment of resources moderately unequal. In such a case, equilibrium can be 
found in the interior range. As the resources disparity increases, the strong form of 
the paradox no longer holds. When the resource asymmetry becomes sufficiently 
large, the opponents enter a corner-solution range where only a weak form of the 
paradox of power applies. It is defined ‘weak’ because, although no longer 
equalized, attained incomes could be less unequal than the initial resource 
endowment. 
8 See among others: Grossman (1991/1998), Skaperdas (1992), Garfinkel (1994), 
Grossman and Kim (1995), Skaperdas and Syropoulos (1996), Neary (1997), Noh 
(1999), Anderton and Carter (1999), Anderton (2000), Reuveny and Maxwell (2001), 
Stauvermann (2002), Dixit (2004).  
9 Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2000) deal with the potential outbreak of a war, that is 
of exploitation of actual violence. The formal analysis, however, does not change. 
  6Within this framework, the total contestable output denoted 
by (2) can be disposed in one of two ways: through conflict with an 
uncertain outcome or through a peaceful and predefined division of 
the ‘pie’. The latter can be interpreted as a negotiated trade 
agreement over an aggregate output. ‘Guns’ play a role in both cases. 
In case of a war, ‘guns’ determine the probability of winning for each 
party; while in case of a settlement they influence each party’s 
negotiating position and therefore the share of the ‘pie’ they receive. 
Then, each party has an incentive to allocate some of the initial 
resources to ‘guns’. Hence, Garfinkel and Skaperdas assume that 
each party’s share of total contestable output is a weighted 
combination of two possible rules: (i) the CSF and (ii) a symmetric 
split-of-surplus10 rule of division, and the relative weights are 
determined by a destruction parameter denoted  ( ) 1 , 0 ∈ β . As β  
increases, the conflict becomes less and less destructive. The income 
distribution equation becomes: 
 












β  for 2 , 1 = i     (7) 
 
where superscripts ‘w’ denote ‘war’. The level of ‘guns’ chosen in 
equilibrium is exactly as in (5) whilst the payoffs are given by: 
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Consider now the probability of a settlement taking into account the 
rule for dividing the output produced through the aggregate 
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For sake of simplicity, only for this section the superscripts ‘cc’ will be substituted 
by ‘w’. In particular note that   
10 An equal split of a pie under some circumstances is a common feature of 
bargaining theory. Lopomo and Ok (2001) provide a positive theory for such a fair 
(50-50) division of gains from trade.  
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where the superscript ‘ ’ denotes ‘settlement’. Hence, relative 
weights between the two rules of division are determined by the 
destruction parameter. When 
s
β  is small, the contest success function 
of armed conflict plays a smaller role in the determination of the 
distribution of output under settlement. That is, each side’s choice of 
fighting efforts has a small impact on the settlement outcome. The 
equilibrium under settlement is denoted by: 
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Comparing the payoffs in case of war and settlement, it is possible to 
determine when settlement is preferable to conflict: given that  1 < β , 
the payoffs under settlement are higher than those under war. More 
precisely  . At the same time, when 
w s U U * * > 1 < β  the settlement 
induces less arming, i.e.  . Note that if 
w s z z * * < 1 = β (i.e. the conflict is 
not destructive) the payoffs are identical in both scenarios. Hence, 
within this static setting, it would appear that settlement is better 
than war for both parties. Therefore, given a higher payoff, 
settlement is likely to be preferred by both rational parties. Formally 
speaking, recalling (11) and (8) it is possible to write that a settlement 
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For sake of simplicity call (12) a settlement condition Whenever it 
holds (for  1 < β ), the settlement is expected to be preferable with 
respect to conflict. Thus, an agent is expected to prefer settlement if 
and only if its own utility under settlement is higher than in case of a 
war. The discriminating factor in the framework presented by 
Garfinkel and Skaperdas is the destructiveness of a war: the more 
destructive is a war, the lower will be the incentive to wage it.  
 
II. THE IMPACT OF TRADE POLICIES 
Hereafter I borrow and extend the latter model presented in the 
foregoing section. First, differently from Garfinkel and Skaperdas I 
  8assume that conflict does not involve actual violence, but only a 
potential use of force and violence. Indeed, potential exploitation of 
force is captured through the level of ‘guns’ chosen by both parties. 
Hence, following Hirshleifer, I assume that each side makes an 
optimal once-and-for-all choice of ‘butter’ and ‘guns’.  
Moreover, I re-define the destructiveness parameter affecting 
the optimal choice and the behaviour of agents.  Note that the degree 
of destructiveness can be interpreted as the perception agents retain 
about the expected real impact of conflict. In other words, they are 
expected to make a choice taking into account the perceived impact 
of a conflict as an ex-ante evaluation of the outcome of a struggle. 
Thus, it is the expected real impact of conflict. The assumption of 
( 1 0, ∈ ) β , common among economic models of conflict, would imply 
that the struggle is always considered destructive, since only a 
fraction of the available output can be retained by each contestant.  
Since I consider conflict as a permanent feature of the 
interaction between the two opponents, it might be said that the 
expected real impact of conflict is related to the welfare losses due to 
devoting resources to permanent military expenditures11, that is the 
amount of resources devoted to ‘guns’. However, in most cases, 
policy-makers are not economists. Then, taking into account 
thatβ proxies an evaluation of parties it would be possible to say that 
they can also assume that  1 > β . In other words, parties can look at 
conflict as stimulating the existing output. The argument is close to 
that trivially known as ‘Keynesian Militarism’ This is a much-
debated question, but the idea behind it is simple. A government 
spending is supposed to increase the global demand and therefore 
increases growth12. According to this view, even if a war does not 
break out large investments in military sector can also be expected to 
have a positive impact on aggregate output13
                                                 
11 For a general discussion of the huge literature on the negative affects of military 
investments see Arrow (2000).  
12 The classical example is the US economy before World War II. In 1941 the 
American economy had still not recovered from the Great Depression. The war 
spending provided the necessary ‘stimulus’: GNP grew by 12 percent from 1941 to 
1942, 18 percent the following year and by 1945 half of United Stated GDP was war 
production but at the same time the civilian production was higher than 1941. 
13 A very much debated support to this view was given by Benoit (1973), who 
found a significant positive correlation between the share of production devoted to 
defence and military expenditures and the growth rate of non-military output.  
  9 
Hereafter I assume for sake of simplicity that parties have the 
same expectation about the real impact of conflict and that there is 
common knowledge about this. Then, let re-define the parameter β  
as the expected real impact of conflict and assume that  () ∞ ∈ , 0 β . 
When  ( 1 0, ∈ ) β  the expected real impact of the conflict is destructive. 
On the other hand, when  ( ) ∞ ∈ , 1 β the conflict is non-destructive. At 
1 = β the conflict can be considered neutral. 
A second extension deals with the existence of trade policies. 
In fact, in reality trade is often obstructed by several unnatural 
measures imposed by rulers and commonly known as trade policies: 
tariffs, quotas, blockades, standard regulations etc… These measures 
negatively affect the patterns of trade between the two parties. 
Following the common international trade theory, in most cases, it is 
possible to say that tariffs and other instruments of trade policy 
negatively affect the welfare effects of trade through the combined 
effect of consumer surplus, producer surplus and government 
revenue. In general, protectionism benefits producers and hurt 
consumers. In fact, trade policies are commonly designed and 
implemented to favour interest groups and to redistribute income to 
politically influential sectors. Governments are not committed to 
benefit total welfare, but only to favour some interest groups. This 
would imply that the main concern of policy-makers is the emphasis 
on producer surplus. Such approach of over-weighting the producer 
surplus is not a novelty in literature. For instance, Staiger (1995) 
designs a government’s utility function imposing a weight on 
producer surplus that captures political economy considerations. 
Consider such economic incentive as a ‘primary’ objective of trade 
policy implemented by a government. Consider now that there can 
be also ‘secondary’ objectives14 related to the non-economic effects of 
trade policies. Hirschmann (1945/1980) presented the famous 
argument of the two-fold effect of international trade: (i) the supply 
effect that is the ordinary and well known benefiting effect of larger 
markets; (ii) the power (influence) effect according to which trade can 
become a direct source of power. In narrative form, Cooper (1972) 
explains a similar concept when he interprets trade policy as an 
important part of a broader foreign policy15. 
                                                 
14 However, I do not use ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ to rank governments’ 
preferences. I do it  only in order to describe different objectives.  
15 See also Cooper (1973) and Cooper (1987).  
  10Therefore, I modify the value of the contested output using a 
weight that is assumed to proxy the complex range of trade 
policies16. Let θ  be the weight denoting the complex range of trade 
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with the superscript ‘ot’ denoting the ‘obstructed trade’ scenario. I 
assume  ( ) ∞ ∈ , 0 θ . If  1 = θ , trade policies are neutral. That is, it means 
that trade policies are supposed not to affect the contestable output, 
or that there is no kind of impediment. If  1 < θ  trade policies 
negatively affect the available output. By contrast, if  1 > θ , trade 
policies are intended to pose an over-weight on producer surplus. 
Comparing the payoffs of continuing conflict and settlement 
under the impact of trade policies it would be possible to determine 
when settlement is preferable to conflict. Through ordinary 
maximization process the optimal simultaneous choices of ‘guns’ are 
derived, as well as the payoffs.  
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It is possible now to re-write the settlement condition. Recalling 
equation (8)17 it is possible to write that a settlement is always 
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Call (16) settlement condition under protection, linking the expected 
impact of conflict with the existence of trade policies. Rearranging 
and  manipulating inequality (14), the settlement condition becomes: 
                                                 
16 Note that in this extremely simplified scenario, I do not consider the effects of 
prices, exchange rates, and hence terms of trade. 
17 Equation (8) is exactly equivalent to the continuing conflict equilibrium solution 
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Moreover, it is also possible to look at the ‘peacefulness’ of the latter 
scenario. As specified above, a state of the world is considered more 
‘peaceful’ than another if the equilibrium level of ‘guns’ is lower. In 
this case, it implies that:   where the stars subscripted denote 
the symmetric equilibrium level. That is, recalling (14) and (5), 
‘peacefulness’ implies that: 
cc ot z z * * <
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Rearranging, simplifying and manipulating (18) the ‘peacefulness 
condition’ simply becomes: 
 
1 < β          ( 1 9 )  
 
Using (17) and (19) as strict equalities it is possible to plot the 
indifference loci curves. Scaling the expected real impact of the 
conflict (β ) against the impact of trade policies (θ ), different areas 
can be identified (see figure 1). The graph shows how the 
settlement/conflict trade-off is modified when the impact of both 
trade policies and conflict changes. The curve plots the indifference 
locus capturing the settlement condition. That is, at any point of this 
curve agents are able to reach the same level of utility both if they 
choose to conflict and if they choose to settle and exchange. At any 
point on the right of this curve, conflict provides a higher utility than 
settlement. The vertical line plots the locus of peacefulness condition. 
At any point at the left of the line, the level of ‘guns’ under protection 
is lower than in the continuing conflict scenario. 
 




Note that these conditions hold regardless of any disparity in initial 
resources endowments. In fact, manipulating (16) and (18), the sum 
  12of endowments   cancels out. Therefore, only the impact of 
trade policies and conflict matters. The four areas drawn have 
different equilibria configurations: 
) ( 2 1 n n +
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That is, the equilibrium utility level is higher in case of settlement, 
whilst the level of ‘guns’ is higher under protection than in 
continuing conflict. Call this armed settlement The agents have 
incentives to settle and trade but they also choose a higher level of 
arming than in continuing conflict. This can occur when the conflict 
is perceived as not-destructive. At the same time trade policies also 
are expected to foster higher gains. This appears to reject the liberal 
idea of ‘peacefulness’ of the trading state. It may fit with the concept 
according to which merchant states arm in order to a) protect their 
trade linkages in absence of property rights and contract 
enforcement mechanisms; b) to expand their own control on control 
over resources.  
The condition I defined armed settlement could be seen in the 
experience of the British navigation act. It was intended to assure that 
foreign trade would be carried on in such a way as to yield the 
maximum advantage to Great Britain. Thus, the existence and the 
protection of a monopoly induced higher spending for ‘guns’. Adam 
Smith was aware that military expense was required in order to 
maintain this monopoly18
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18 Adam Smith, (Book IV, Chapter VII, part second)  “Whatever expence Great Britain 
has hitherto laid out in maintaining this dependency, has really been laid out in order to 
support this monopoly[…] The expence of the ordinary peace establishment of the colonies 
amounted[…], to the pay of twenty regiments of foot; to the expence of artillery, store, and 
extraordinary provisions with which is necessary to supply them; and to the expence of a 
very considerable naval force which constantly kept up[…]”. On the interdependence of 
trade and military expansion see Cipolla (1965). On the role of monopoly in 
European expansion see Hamilton (1948).  
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That is, the level of utility achieved to trade, although under 
protection, is higher than in the continuing conflict scenario. In a 
parallel way, the settlement occurs with a lower level of ‘guns’ This 
scenario better fits with the idea of the ‘peaceful spillover’ of trade 
between states. Albeit non-cooperative, the agents recognize the 
incentives to trade instead of engaging in a continuing conflict19. 
This is also due to the opportunity cost of a conflict. This 
appears to be extremely powerful if it is considered that states are 
also willing to suffer a high burden of trade protection rather than 
being engaged in a struggle. This links with the traditional liberal 
idea according to which free trade is associated with a more peaceful 
situation because of the certainty of welfare gains to be achieved by 
societies. This resembles the historical experience of the German 
Zollverein20
The area (III), denoted by the expression weak conflict, is 
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That is, agents have an incentive to follow the path of a continuing 
conflict due to the higher utility they can reach, but at the same time 
the level of ‘guns’ they choose simultaneously is lower than that they 
                                                 
19 This is exactly the basic idea surrounding the argument of peaceful effect of 
trade. In sum, the basic consideration is that societies can gain and pursue a higher 
level of welfare from trading. Hence when it comes to choose whether being 
involved in conflict or not, a rational actor (the state) takes into account the 
opportunity cost of reducing welfare. Hence, freer trade is associated with a more 
peaceful situation because of the certainty of welfare gains to be achieved by 
societies. Polachek (1980) firstly provides a simple formal microeconomic model. 
The model is based on a country social welfare function assumed to be derived 
from the preference sets of the entire population. Following a standard trade 
model, when a country is engaged in a conflict, a restriction in trade fosters a 
deterioration of terms of trade given the impact of conflict on prices. Then, since 
conflict is assumed to affect the price of trade, the rational behaviour of a country 
will be choosing an optimal level of hostility that maximizes the welfare function 
given the balance of payments constraint. The equilibrium is reached when results 
of the model that the net cost associated with extra hostility equals the welfare 
benefit of more hostility. Polachek has refined his basic model also providing 
empirical support to his argument in Polachek (1992, 1994, 1997) and in Polachek et 
al. (1999). 
20 On development of Zollverein see Bazillion (1990). 
  14would have chosen under trade policies. This is due to the different 
impact of destructiveness and trade protection. More precisely, on 
the left of the intersection point of the two curves the expected real 
impact of conflict appears to be more powerful. States are willing to 
suffer the burden of a depriving trade protection because a struggle 
appears to be extremely destructive.  
This could be close to the historical experience of the Cold 
War. The political climate, in fact, strongly affected the potential 
trade patterns between Western and Eastern hemispheres, through 
creating formal and informal high trade impediments. At the same 
time the escalation of a nuclear war appeared to be so destructive as 
to prevent the occurrence of a total war. As the conflict becomes less 
and less destructive, agents choose to be engaged in a permanent 
conflict at a lower level of ‘guns’ than in a continuing conflict 
scenario. When the conflict appears to be not-destructive, parties are 
still willing to experience a weak conflict if the impact of trade 
policies is expected to deprive available income. This appears to be 
also the case of international economic sanctions (boycotts and 
embargoes)21 imposed in order to inflict an economic damage to an 
opponent country. The phenomenon of international negative 
sanctions is a clear example of conflict as a permanent feature. Both 
sender and target country are negatively affected because of the 
trade disruption that emerges.  
Area (IV) does fit perfectly with the continuing conflict state of 
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That is, a continuing conflict provides a higher utility and the 
agents allocate a higher amount of resources to ‘guns’  Such a case 
seems to be also considered as the prelude to the outbreak of a war. 
It is possible now to recall Cooper (1972b), who stated: Where the total 
gains from trade are high, preservation of trade becomes a matter of high 
foreign policy, as it is sometimes called, or even of national security. Thus, a 
high value placed on trade may lead countries to war over it, as it led Japan 
                                                 
21 For a survey on some key theoretical contributions on sanctions see Caruso 
(2003).  
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in 1941 to attack the Philippines and the United States fleet at Pearl Harbor 
to remove threats to its oil trade with the East Indies22. 
Thus, it is worth noting that the model shows how different 
combinations of the parameters lead to different equilibria. Note that 
an important finding is linked to the irrelevance of the initial 
resource endowments, whereas asymmetry does not seem to affect 
the choices of the parties. The most important element is re-
distributive mechanism.  
These findings contribute to the enduring debate among 
scholars on the relationship between trade and conflict. 
Traditionally, there are two basic theoretical positions. The liberal 
idea argues that international trade is the root of political co-
operation and amity, whereas a second position argues that 
international trade can contribute to political conflict and hostility23 
The model does not allow to espouse neither the first nor the second. 
It provides the classical economists’ answer -  ‘it depends’.  
 
III. A TRADE INSTITUTION AS A PEACEFUL INSTITUTION? 
What are the potential ‘peaceful’ benefits from establishing rules for 
the conduct of trade policy? Moreover, what are the gains in terms of 
peace of a trade agreement? Although the relationship between trade 
and conflict has been controversial among scholars, relatively little 
attention has been paid to the impact of institutional framework 
underpinning the expansion of economic interactions. Only a few 
studies deal with the question of whether an institutional scenario on 
trade also fosters an easing of tensions between opponents. 
Mansfield and Pevehouse (2000) and Mansfield (2003) argue 
that parties in a same preferential trade agreement are less prone to 
interstate conflict than other states, thanks to the higher gain from 
trade arising under a preferential agreement. However, such 
approach minimizes the importance of specific choices among 
several types of preferential trade agreement. In reality, a different 
institutional framework affects and modifies incentives, gains and 
costs for participating countries. Schiff and Winters (1997) also 
address this point modelling a world in which regional trade 
agreements are expected to reduce security tensions between 
neighbors. Padoan (1997) distinguishes different degrees of 
                                                 
22 Cooper (1972b) p. 179. 
23 For a comprehensive survey see Reuveny (2000). See also the volume edited by 
Mansfield and Pollins (2003).  
  16integration. The deeper the level of integration, the higher the gains 
in terms of security. Given the benefits of reciprocal exchange are 
higher than those of reciprocal aggression a deeper integration also 
raises the capability of resistance against a common external threat, 
both economic and non economic. 
These studies, however, consider the ‘peacefulness’ of a trade 
arrangement exclusively as a positive externality and abstract from 
the relevance of defence expenditures as a way to generate security. 
If we do not consider the existence of resources allocated to defence 
and aggression, this would imply that in a broader view all the 
literature on economic integration can be broadly meant as a 
literature on security and formation of a peaceful environment. But 
this is just a part of the story. In fact, the outcome of the foregoing 
section showed that two opponents may have incentive to settle, but 
under a wide set of conditions they still have incentives to arm (recall 
the  armed settlement scenario). This result does suggest that the 
expected gains of trade do not suffice to prevent arming and perhaps 
also the escalation of conflict. Harmony does not take place suddenly 
because of higher gains. It is reasonable to think that there could be 
an amount of resources agents are willing to devote in order to 
pursue this kind of goal. 
To the best of my knowledge, a first attempt in this direction is 
by Genicot and Skaperdas (2002). They develop a model where 
adversaries divide their resources between guns, butter and 
investments in conflict management. The authors show that how rich 
the adversaries are has a large effect on the probability of peace. The 
poorer the adversaries, in the sense of the real resources they possess, 
the lower their investment in conflict management and the lower the 
probability of peace. In addition, poorer adversaries will devote 
proportionately greater percentage of their resources to guns and less 
to butter than richer adversaries, thus compounding the effects of 
initial resource poverty. Genicot and Skaperdas also show that a 
greater number of adversaries increases the probability of peace, 
when adversaries start with their own resources - like when a new 
country enters an existing conflict. The authors show that there are 
different feasible equilibria.  
 
IV. A TENTATIVE  MODELING OF A TRADE INSTITUTION 
 Up to this point, I considered formally only the distinction between 
‘butter’ and ‘guns’ Now, I assume that agents divert a certain 
amount of resources to join a trade institution. The agents of the 
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model can either fight or settle, as before. The main novelty is the 
existence of a set of rules for trade interactions which affects the 
incentives of agents. Therefore, the agents can bind themselves in a 
set of rules and procedures that affect the outcome of conflict on the 
contestable output.  
I also introduce some limiting hypothesis on the ‘benchmark’ 
design for a trade institution. First, a trade institution is capable to 
establish and enforce a free trade area between members; no barriers 
to trade or strategic policies are allowed. Moreover, the institution is 
supposed to implement a set of rules and procedures governing 
trade interactions. Hence, given the existence of rules, trade is 
supposed to be ‘fair’. In other words, there is no bias in favour of a 
more powerful or an unfair ‘contestant’24. 
The countries join the institution by giving up a certain 
amount of resources, say the membership fee. This amount of resources 
is assumed to be equal between contestants. Paying this membership 
fee, governments also signal the intention to comply with obligations 
emerging under an institutional regime. For analytical simplicity, it is 
assumed to be exogenous. Being exogenous, the membership fee does 
fit more with a scenario where an institution already does exist and 
other parties are allowed to join it. The intuition behind the nature of 
such membership fee relates to Boulding’s idea of ‘grant economy’ in 
integrative systems25 A grant is supposed to be an unilateral transfer 
from an individual, a group or a social unit to another. When it 
occurs, the agent does not receive directly anything in return. Parties 
obviously expect to benefit from this disbursement. Such a benefit is 
supposed to come indirectly, enhancing the advantages of trade 
within the framework of the institutional set of rules. The reduction 
                                                 
24 Usually, an enduring enforcement is associated with the existence of a dispute 
settlement system (DSS). Hence, this rules out any ‘imbalance of power’ between 
countries, since a dispute settlement procedure is designed to be rule-driven and 
not power-driven and it is assumed not to be biased in favour of any party in a 
dispute This is supposed to pave the way for a stable rule-oriented system. Agents 
observe the existence of DSS and assume that it is able to enforce the set of rules to 
keep the trade contest ‘fair’. Since the system is designed to preserve free and fair 
trade, each player trusts the capacity of the institution to ensure an enduring 
compliance with the institutionalized set of rules. Perhaps, the most effective 
example of a successful dispute resolution mechanism is the European Court of 
Justice. It doubtlessly has been a cornerstone of European integration.  
25 Boulding expounded in a comprehensive manner the theory of ‘grants 
economics’ in Boulding et al. (1972)  and in Boulding (1973).   
  18of resources devoted to unproductive ‘guns’ is also a pillar of 
contractarian approach as expounded in Skogh and Stuart (1982).  
To summarize, in the benchmark case, a trade institution is 
assumed to: a) establish free trade between participants; b) make the 
trade ‘fair’, that, in absence of asymmetries by assumption, does 
imply the split-of-surplus rule of division of the pie between 
contestants holds; c) preserve a ‘fair’ free trade through a rule-driven 
system; d) it also requires an exactly identical membership fee from all 
members. Thus, the resources partition equation  becomes: 
 
i i i i h z x n + + =        ( 2 1 )  
 
where h denotes the exogenous membership fee. As in the foregoing 
section, each party’s share of total output is a weighted combination 
of two rules of division. Their relative weights are determined by the 
parameter denoting the expected real impact of the conflict. Then, 
also in this case, the second rule is indicated as the split-the-surplus 
rule of division. The utility function for each country becomes: 
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where the superscript ‘ins ’ denotes ‘institution’. In the CSF,   can be 
considered a constant vector that affects the ordinary outcome of the 
contests
h
26. In the CSF the membership fee decreases the amount of 
resources devoted to ‘guns’27. In this case it would negatively affect 
the poorer participant. That is, given the resources constraint of each 
contestant, the poorer side is relatively more impoverished. The first 
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26 As pointed out by Skaperdas (1996) this is not true for ‘logit’ form of CSF.  
27 To the best of my knowledge, such type of modification is a novelty in literature, 
whilst there are some examples with an additive form. See Amegashie (2005), 
Dasgupta and Nit (1998).  
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It yields a symmetric interior Nash equilibrium with  . 
It is simple to demonstrate that the equilibrium level of ‘guns’ is: 
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Recalling (8)28 it is possible to show that a settlement under a trade 
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Manipulating and rewriting, the settlement condition becomes: 
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Call this settlement condition under institution. Given  ) , ( ∞ ∈ 0 1 n  and 
 the settlement condition depends upon the value of  ) , ( ∞ ∈ 0 2 n β and 
. Since  , if  h ) , ( ∞ ∈ 0 h [ ) ∞ ∈ , 1 β  the first term is positive whereas the 
second term is negative. That is, the settlement condition cannot be 
satisfied. In other words, when the expected real impact of conflict is 
not-destructive, parties do not settle. That is, the expected benefits of 
conflict are higher than those agents get through an institution. If 
( 1 0, ∈ ) β , the settlement condition is satisfied if and only if 
 In other words, parties can retain a level of utility 
higher than in continuing conflict, when they perceive the conflict as 
being destructive and the level of membership fee lies in an interval 
whose upper bound is given by the level of ‘guns’ each side would 
] / ) [( 4 2 1 n n h + <
                                                 
28 For sake of simplicity consider equation (8) as being applied to a continuing 
conflict scenario. then hereafter 
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. See also footnote no. 17. 
  20choose optimally under continuing conflict. To summarize formally, 
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What about the level of ‘guns’? According to the common definition 
adopted in this work, a scenario is considered more peaceful if and 
only if the level of guns is lower than in another scenario. Therefore, 
the  peacefulness condition under institution is  . That is, 
recalling equations (5) and (24), it is possible to write: 
cc ins z z * * <
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Manipulating and re-arranging: 
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Then, the allocation of resources to conflict also depends upon the 











































    ( 3 1 )  
 
yet in this case the peacefulness condition is satisfied when  ) , ( 1 0 ∈ β  
(conflict is perceived as destructive), and the upper bound for the 
critical value of h  equals exactly the level of ‘guns’ which parties 
would choose in continuing conflict scenario. This suggests the idea 
that guns and membership fee  can be interpreted as substitutes. When 
the conflict appears to be destructive and the membership fee is 
lower than the amount of resources allocated to ‘guns’ under conflict, 
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joining a trade institution is unambiguously more peaceful than 
continuing conflict. By contrast, when  [ ] ∞ ∈ , 1 β  joining an institution 
is more peaceful only if and only if the membership fee is greater than 
the optimal level of ‘guns’ in continuing conflict. However, the latter 
is not feasible since each side will choose an institution if and only if 
( 1 0, ∈ ) β .   
  
To summarise, if ( 1 0, ∈ ) β and  ( )
cc z h * , 0 ∈ the model shows that both 
parties are better off if they settle under an institution. The choice of 
parties is driven by the level of payoffs which are higher than in 
continuing conflict scenario. In other words, parties are aware of the 
room of improvement in both their payoffs. Then, they decide to 
decrease their allocations to guns and increase their allocations to 
productive activities. In such a way, they move towards a more 
efficient equilibrium.  
 
V. UNFAIRNESS OF SETTLEMENT 
In the foregoing section a cornerstone of the model presented was 
the split-of-the-surplus rule of division. Now I relax this assumption. 
Albeit rationally justified, a symmetric split is not likely to occur very 
often in reality. Many situations in reality confirm the existence of 
‘unfair’ agreements29 Therefore, it is possible to say that expression 
(22) is a special case of: 
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Where  [ ] 2 , 1 , 1 , 0 = ∈ i i δ  denotes the share of output received by each 
agent under a negotiated settlement over the contestable output. 
Moreover, I assume that  1 2 1 = +δ δ and that  2 1 δ δ > . Then, more 
precisely ( ] 1 , 2 / 1 1 ∈ δ  and  [ ) 2 / 1 , 0 2 ∈ δ . That is, agent 1 retains a larger 
                                                 
29 Perroni and Whalley (1994) try to resolve this seeming paradox by interpreting 
such agreements as insurance arrangements for smaller countries, which partially 
protect them against the consequences of a global trade war. What they offer to the 
large countries in return is largely non-trade benefits (such as restraints on 
domestic policies in the smaller countries, firmer intellectual property protection, 
firmer guarantees of royalty arrangements affecting resources on state-owned 
lands). In fact, when evaluated relative to a post-retaliation tariff equilibrium the 
value of these agreements to small countries is large because they help preserve 
existing access to larger foreign markets. 
  22fraction of contested output than agent 2. Moreover, given the results 
of the foregoing section I allow only for  ( ) 1 0, ∈ β . The utility 
functions of both agents become: 
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Solving simultaneously the system of (34a) and (34b) and using 
1 2 1 = +δ δ  yields the asymmetric equilibrium choices of ‘guns’ for the 
two parties:  
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Equilibrium level of ‘guns’ are expressed in terms of any party own 
share of the ‘pie’, the destruction parameter, the ‘membership fee’ 
and the sum of both parties initial endowment. Given  2 1 δ δ ≠ the 
equilibrium level of ‘guns’ for both agents differ, that is  . In 
particular given 
ins ins z z 2 1 ≠
2 1 δ δ > and  ( ) 1 0, ∈ β  by assumption, it is possible to 
verify that  if and only if 
ins ins z z 2 1 <
4
2 1 n n
h
+
< .  
Thus, the party which has to receive the larger part of the output 
would arm less than the opponent. This confirms the outcome of the 
previous section. The payoffs for both parties are given by: 
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Since  2 1 δ δ > it is simple to verify that  , that is, the agent 
which has to receive the larger part of the income will get a higher 
payoff than the contender. 
ins ins U U 2 1 >
Recall the level of payoffs of the symmetric equilibrium in the 
continuing conflict scenario denoted by (10). Since within this last 
framework the equilibrium is no longer symmetric, two settlement 
conditions are to be derived. Then, agent 1 will prefer to settle under 
an institution if and only if  . In a similar way agent 2 will 
settle if and only if  . Therefore, the settlement conditions 
for both parties are: 
cc ins U U 1 1 >
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Manipulating and re-writing inequality (39) it is possible to find the 
critical value for the membership fee. Given  2 1 δ δ ≠  critical values 
clearly differ. Then, for both parties the critical values of h are: 
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Both critical values depend on the fraction of the ‘pie’ each party can 
retain. In particular, they differ and  . The party with a higher 
fraction of the contestable output is likely to bear the burden of a 
higher membership fee to join a trade institution. Recall condition 
(28), namely the settlement condition under a fair institution. 
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namely the room for settlement under unfairness is lesser than the 
foregoing fair scenario. 
  24Recall also that the equilibrium level of ‘guns’ of the party 
with a lower ‘share’ of the contested income is higher than the 
opponent. Is this environment more peaceful than continuing 
conflict? That is, is the level of guns for both contenders lower than 
in continuing conflict scenario? Comparing (37) with (9) it is possible 
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Then, alike in the foregoing section when the membership fee is below 
the level of ‘guns’ parties would choose in the continuing conflict 
scenario, whatever the ‘share’ of the ‘pie’ each party can retain, the 
institutional scenario can be considered ‘more peaceful’ than the 








































This section confirmed the ‘core’ outcomes of the basic model: with 
the existence of a trade institution two risk-neutral agents can 
compete for a higher utility than in a continuing conflict scenario. 
That is, within this framework they are predicted to settle under an 
institution despite its unfairness. More precisely:  
(i)  both parties arm less than in ‘continuing conflict’ scenario 
and retain a higher payoff than in continuing conflict 
scenario.  Such ‘unfair’ division of the expected gains from 
exchange under an agreement also make parties better off, 
but the party which is supposed to retain a lower part is 
predicted to arm more than the opponent; 
(ii)  both parties are willing to transfer ‘one-way’ a certain 
amount of resources to join a trade institution. Consider 
the critical value of the membership fee as a proxy for the 
‘willingness to settle’ of each agent. The point of interest is 
that that party which retains a higher fraction of the 
contested output and arm more also has a lower 
willingness to settle than the opponent. 
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(iii)  The level of initial endowments does not matter. Only the 
predicted fractions of the ‘pie’ do. Then, the driving force 




This work attempted to develop a theory of integrative action which 
takes the existence of conflict into account from the start. The main 
original results I would claim for this work are two-fold.  
First, I show how a peaceful settlement can occur in the shadow 
of conflict30 under an institutional set of rules. Although the 
relationship between trade and conflict has been controversial 
among scholars, relatively little attention has been paid to the impact 
of institutional framework underpinning the expansion of economic 
interactions. Only a few studies of international economic relations 
deal with the question of whether an institutional setting fosters an 
easing of tensions amongst members. Most of them, however, do not 
consider the existence of resources allocated to ‘guns’; this would 
imply that in a broader view all the literature on economic 
integration can be broadly meant as a literature on security and 
formation of peaceful environment since ‘peace’ is simply considered 
as a positive externality of economic integration. Differently from the 
existing literature, in this work ‘peacefulness’ does not appear  to be 
a mechanical benign externality of trade interactions; the reductions 
of resources allocated to ‘guns’ take shape under an institutional 
setting. The existence of an institutional scenario requires that actors 
would be willing to devote resources for preventing and solving 
conflicts. Moreover, given the perfect information, both parties 
giving up a certain amount of resources also signal their willingness 
to settle to the opponent.  
This is in the spirit of integrative relationships, as described by 
Kenneth Boulding. Indeed, the modelling proposed in the fourth 
section of the paper is a novel tentative formalization of Kenneth 
Boulding’s idea of integrative relationship. The cornerstone of 
integrative relationships are ‘one-way’ transfers (or ‘grants’ in 
Boulding’s definition). Through a crucial extension of CSF, formal 
key of Hirshleifer-style models of conflict, the emergence of 
institutions is modelled.  
                                                 
30 This expression is borrowed from Anderton and Carter (1999). 
  26The results of the model provide interesting findings and 
insights on the role of institutions. On the one hand, the optimal 
choice of ‘guns’ in an ‘institutional scenario’ is lower than in 
‘continuing conflict’ scenario; that is, this state of the world is more 
‘peaceful’. On the other hand, the opponents are both better off 
under an institution. Even if a certain amount of resources is still 
diverted to guns, final payoffs are higher than in the ‘continuing 
conflict’ scenario. Therefore, both opponents are willing to ‘one-way’ 
transfer a certain amount of resources to provide for a settlement of 
conflict under a trade institution. In formal terms, this result has been 
obtained through the modification of the CSF in its ratio form. At the 
same time, the choice of the ratio form for the CSF rules out any 
possible equilibrium which could be defined as ‘total peace’, namely 
when there is no investment in guns for both parties. 
In the last section, a crucial modification to the basic model is 
taken into account. It shows that even if the settlement is predicted to 
be ‘unfair’, both parties arm less than in the ‘continuing conflict’ 
scenario and also gain a higher payoff. Such an ‘unfair’ division of 
the expected gains from exchange under an agreement also makes 
parties better off with respect to continuing conflict; in the 
meanwhile, the party which is supposed to gain a lower amount is 
predicted to arm more than the opponent. The above results hold 
irrespectively of the level of initial endowments. Only the predicted 
fractions of the ‘pie’ accruing to the parties matter. Then, the driving 
force for agents’ decisions is represented by the re-distributive 
mechanism. 
Even if the ‘core’ goal of this work is devoted to studying the 
emergence of institutions, interesting insights emerge analysing the 
impact of trade policies on conflict in an anarchic world. The findings 
of the second section contribute to a enduring debate among 
scholars: the existence of a causal relationship between trade and 
conflict. In the ‘obstructed trade’ state of the world the extended 
model allows for different equilibria areas, which I label as (i) armed 
settlement; (ii) peaceful settlement; (iii) weak conflict; (iv) continuing 
conflict. Different equilibria link with different combination of the 
destructiveness parameter and the parameter measuring the impact 
of trade policies on real output appropriation. It is proved, for 
example, that when parties assign a high value on contestable output 
they have incentives to arm more.  
A paradoxical outcome seems to occur: parties can prefer to 
settle, but at a higher level of ‘guns’. This equilibrium, which I define 
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‘armed settlement’ appears to fit with the trading expansion of some 
European powers in last centuries. Under different parameters 
values, parties prefer to settle and exchange in a more ‘peaceful’ 
environment. It is also possible that parties engage in an enduring 
conflict, but at a low level of ‘guns’. This seems to be the case of 
b o y c o t t s  a n d  e m b a r g o e s .  I n  s u c h  a  c a s e  b o t h  s e n d e r  a n d  t a r g e t  
country are negatively affected, because of trade disruption.  
Finally, this work is of course little more than an exciting start, 
but much remains to be done. There is a large agenda for future 
research, mainly concerning how to relax some simplifying 
assumptions I employed throughout the work: (i) only two party 
interaction; (ii) full information; (iii) a not-decisive technology of 
conflict; (iv) no distinction between offensive and defensive 
technologies; (v) agents as unitary actors; (vi) risk-neutrality of both 
actors; (vii) no definition of market structure and prices.  
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